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CYBERSECURITY AND OFFSHORE OIL:
THE NEXT BIG THREAT
JAMIE CRANDAL*
Abstract
Since 9/11 and the resultant perpetuation of cyberterrorism in both the
public and private sectors, there has been a push to institute regulations that
serve to help prevent cyberterrorism. However, there has been little
advancement in cybersecurity protocols for offshore oil platforms.
This article serves as an insight into the current state of cybersecurity
regulation concerning offshore oil platforms and cyberthreats. It also
examines the potential development of a comprehensive regulatory
framework and the consequential harms from failing to address the growing
threat to such platforms.
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I. Introduction
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig (“Deepwater Horizon”) exploded on
April 20, 2010.1 For eighty-seven days 134 million gallons of oil spilled into
the Gulf of Mexico.2 As a result of the explosion eleven people died, and
seventeen people sustained injuries.3 The spill left the Gulf states reeling with
a disrupted coastal economy and a devastated ecosystem.4 BP PLC,
1. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Settlements: Where the Money Went-Explosion,
Devastation, Decree, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.noaa.gov/explainers/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-settlements-where-moneywent.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates the spill caused
the death of as many as 105,400 sea birds and 167,600 sea turtles; approximately 8.3 billion
oysters were lost. There was also 51-percent decrease in dolphins in Louisiana’s Barataria
Bay. The spilled oil covered coral and marine life causing disruption to reproduction cycles
and significant impacts on the fishing industry. The impacts of the spill on the health of those
living in the most impacted areas are unknown.
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Anadarko, TransOcean and Halliburton owned and operated the Deepwater
Horizon.5 A $20.8 billion settlement in April of 2016 “ended all civil and
criminal penalty claims against the owners and operators of the rig.”6 As of
January of 2018, BP PLC again raised estimates for outstanding claims, and
total costs escalated to $65 billion.7 While BP paid for the clean-up of the oil
and paid the penalty for causing the disaster no amount of money will ever
make up for the lives lost that day. The spill was the result of “poor risk
management, last-minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to
critical indicators, inadequate well control response and insufficient
emergency bridge response training by companies and individuals
responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of the
Deepwater Horizon.”8
Hypothetically, what if the spill was not the result of a series of cascading
operational failures but instead was the result of cascading cyberattacks that
crippled the operations of the rig and started an explosion? If the federal
government does not take stronger action to secure the country’s oil rigs a
cyberattack on an American oil rig—that cripples its functions and causes
fatalities, supply disruption, and millions of dollars of damage—is not only
probable, but a near certainty.
The worst route the industry and the government could take is to wait for
a cyberattack to happen without adequate regulation in place to secure
platforms. Mechanisms to ensure cybersecurity need development, whether
it is industry standard or government regulations. This article evaluates the
current trends in cybersecurity for offshore oil platforms. Currently, securing
offshore oil platforms against cyberattack is based on industry standard and
the assumption of cybersecurity measures into current security regulation
rather than independent federal or state regulations. Certain scholars argue
that industry standard is enough to guarantee that companies will actively
work to secure their platforms,9 but the government cannot expect companies
to base a cybersecurity protocol on shifting industry standards or an
assumption of cybersecurity mandates in existing general security regulation.
This article will outline the scope of cyberthreats that the oil and gas industry
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Ron Bousso, BP Deepwater Horizon Costs Balloon to $65 billion, REUTERS (Jan. 15,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-deepwaterhorizon/bp-deepwater-horizon-costsballoon-to-65-billion-idUSKBN1F50NL.
8. John M. Broder, BP Shortcuts Led to Gulf Oil Spill, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/science/earth/15spill.html.
9. Richard Forno & Ann Hobson, infra note 125.
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(specifically companies involved in offshore drilling) are facing; identify
current industry standards and the federal regulations that are currently in
place concerning or related to cybersecurity; and develop a basis for future
cybersecurity regulation.
A. Parameters of Research
In order to streamline the research on this topic, this article only addresses
the need for enhancements to the federal regulation scheme and industry
standard concerning the cybersecurity of offshore oil platforms. While the
regulation of offshore oil platforms occurs at the federal, international, and
state level, an attempt to cover all governance would create confusion. Any
governance at the international level would occur country by country, and
any regulation enacted at the state level would occur state by state and could
encompass other industries. In order to preempt any confusion this article
adheres to examining federal cybersecurity regulation and domestic industry
standards that could become a federal regulatory framework designed to
ensure cybersecurity on offshore oil platforms.
B. Defining the Terms Involved
The following section defines terms used throughout this article. When
used in this article the terms cybersecurity, cyberattack, and offshore oil
platform carry the following meanings.
Cybersecurity – In this context cybersecurity is defined as “[t]he
prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of, and, if
needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications
systems and the information contained therein to ensure confidentiality,
integrity, and availability; includes protection and restoration, . . . of
information networks and wireline, wireless, [and] satellite[s] . . . .”10
Cyberattacks – Cyberattacks or “attacks” include both malicious and nonmalicious “‘hacks’ in which groups or individuals infiltrate, take over and
destroy or virtually ‘hold hostage’ computer systems for nefarious
purposes.”11 There are three general types of malicious cyberattacks:
(1) hacktivism,” defined as “unauthorized digital intrusion to
express a political agenda, [without intent] to create intimidation
10. Baker Donelson et al., Maritime Cybersecurity Inland and Offshore – Avoiding “Paid
Spies and Secret Confidential Agents on the Water of the Devil” and “Mere Dead Reckoning
of
the
Error-Abounding
Log”,
JD
SUPRA
(Dec.
14,
2016),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/maritime-cybersecurity-inland-and-51369/
(internal
citations omitted).
11. Id.
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or fear”; (2) “cybercrime,” defined as “computer related crime
referring to crimes committed through a computer” and (3)
“cyberterrorism,” defined as “an unlawful attack against computer
networks, to cause violence against persons or property, and as a
result, to coerce a government.12
In contrast, non-malicious attacks—also known as non-malicious security
vulnerabilities—“may arise due to poor system architecture, failure to update
systems (both hardware and software) and potential incompatibilities among
various systems (i.e. a third party contractors’ software not properly syncing
or potentially harming a vessel’s own systems).”13 Regardless of the
innocence or malevolence of an attack both are still extremely dangerous and
can result in the same amount of damage.
Offshore oil platforms – The terms “offshore oil platform,” “offshore rig,”
or “rig” for the purposes of this article all refer to the same thing. The most
recognized technical term for an offshore oil platform is a “mobile offshore
drilling unit.” A mobile offshore drilling unit (“MODU”) “is a unit capable
of engaging in drilling operations for the exploration for, or exploitation of,
resources beneath the seabed such as liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, sulphur
[sic], or salt.”14
Definitions of other relevant terms occur throughout this article in specific
sections. The terms defined here are throughout the entirety of the article.
II. The Next Big Threat
A. Offshore Oil Platforms or Appealing Target for Terrorism
Despite changing opinions towards oil and an increasing desire for clean
energy “natural gas output from offshore fields has risen by more than 50
[percent] ” since 2000.15 Currently, “[m]ore than a quarter of today’s oil and
gas supply is produced offshore.”16 Offshore oil platforms have always been
a high-value target for both physical and cyberattacks.17 Terrorists base the
12. Id. (internal citations omitted).
13. Id. (internal citations omitted).
14. INT'L MAR. ORG., Recommendations for the Training and Certification of Personnel
on Mobile Offshore Units (MOUs) (Mar. 27, 2014), www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/
IndexofIMOResolutions/Assembly/Documents/A.1079(28).pdf.
15. Broder, supra note 8.
16. Int’l Energy Agency, The Future of Offshore Energy, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOKOFFSHORE (May 4, 2018), https://www.iea.org/weo/offshore/.
17. Assaf Harel, Preventing Terrorist Attacks On Offshore Platforms: Do States Have
Sufficient Legal Tools?, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 131, 133-134 (2012).
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value of these assets on “(1) their importance to many states in generating
energy and income and (2) the severe damage an attack on such assets may
inflict.”18 If an offshore oil platform comes under attack, the results could be
catastrophic. An act of terrorism committed on a platform could interrupt a
nation’s regular supply of energy, deprive a nation of an essential source of
income, cause severe and long-term environmental damage, and result in
significant loss of life.19
Part of what makes offshore oil platforms such high-value targets to
terrorists is their extreme vulnerability to physical and cyber assaults and
incredible difficulty to protect.20 Platforms are vulnerable to physical attacks
due to the following reasons. First, offshore platforms are extremely isolated
due to the distance between platforms and/or the distance between a platform
and the shore.21 Second, platforms deal with “large quantities of flammable
liquids or gasses,” translating to an increase in the effectiveness of an attack
regardless of the success of the attack on its own merits.22 Third, an offshore
platform is not like a boat or transoceanic cargo carrier that can be
maneuvered around or away from attackers; platforms are fixed to the ocean
floor.23
Malicious physical attacks are a continued threat to offshore platforms but
cyberattacks are a method of attack which platforms are equally, if not more,
susceptible to. Drilling rigs once isolated by geography are no longer as
isolated as the industry believes them to be due to the interconnectivity of the
platform to the shore.
Automation technologies and the digital oilfield have made
drilling rigs and all the equipment onboard much more
interconnected than before. Look around any rig with PLC-based
systems and you’ll[sic] likely find unsecured USB ports into
which infected flash drives can be plugged. Maintenance laptops,
which employees routinely use to surf the Internet or download
movies when off-duty, are often hooked up to various rig systems
without much consideration of potential cyber risks. Rigs also
commonly provide remote access to multiple shore-based

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 134
Id.
Id. at 134-135 (internal citations omitted)
Id.
Id.
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facilities, whether for real-time operations support or equipment
troubleshooting.24
Part of the inherent fear associated with cyberattacks is the growing
sophistication of hackers. If one attack fails, the next one improves on the
last and is better able to penetrate or find a weakness in the system. Unless
offshore oil platforms want to revert to wholly closed networks there is no
way to guarantee that a rig can be safe from cyberterrorism. There is a
dichotomy between the usefulness of connectivity and the danger of
connectivity on platforms; “[w]e have taken the goodness of technology and
all that it gives us – the efficiencies and safety – but we haven’t
acknowledged the bad.”25 It has taken far too long for the industry to
recognize the inherent danger of inadequate cybersecurity on offshore oil
platforms.26 As a result, the days of a hypothetical threat of cyberattacks have
long since passed, leaving us in an unsecured reality.
B. Scope of the Threat
In the 2018 Global Risks Report from the World Economic Forum,
cyberattacks were third among the top five global risks in terms of
likelihood.27 The report warns how cyberattacks are growing in prevalence
and disruptive potential.28 Statistics have shown a significant uptick in
attacks against businesses: over the last five years attacks have doubled and
sophisticated attacks, that once seemed extraordinary, are now more and
more commonplace.29 Criminals increasingly use cyberattacks to “target
critical infrastructure and strategic industrial sectors, raising fears that, in a
worst-case scenario, attackers could trigger a breakdown in the systems that
keep societies functioning.”30 The oil and gas industry, specifically offshore
oil platforms, are a regularly targeted part of the critical infrastructure of the
United States. This section will examine multiple instances of cyberattacks
that terrorists perpetrated across the globe and identify current vulnerabilities

24. Linda Hsieh, Drilling cybersecurity, DRILLING CONTRACTOR (Sept. 8, 2015),
http://www.drillingcontractor.org/drilling-cybersecurity-36727.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. World Economic Forum [WEF], The Global Risks Report 2018, Figure IV: The
Evolving Risks Landscapes (13th ed., 2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_
Report.pdf.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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in offshore platforms. These attacks could represent potential threats to any
one of the offshore oil platforms operated in the United States.
C. Recent Cyberattacks
Cyberattacks against offshore oil platforms cost companies millions of
dollars of damages each year.31 However, the cost of a cyberattack on an oil
rig, offshore or onshore, goes beyond damages. An attack on an oil rig is an
attack on critical infrastructure and can ultimately “result in more than just
lost revenue – it can be catastrophic for the environment and have farreaching impacts.”32 Having an understanding of the attacks that have taken
place in recent years shows both the scope of the threat and how hard it is to
combat cyberattacks without a protocol for cybersecurity in place.
Huntington Beach, California, 2009 – In 2009, after one of the earliest
recorded cyberattacks on an offshore platform, a Los Angeles federal grand
jury indicted a disgruntled employee on “allegations of temporarily disabling
a computer system detecting pipeline leaks for three oil derricks off the
Southern California coast.”33 The employee faced a maximum ten year term
after being accused of “purposely impairing a computer system that
monitored for leaks.”34 This hack put the Southern California coastline in
danger of a massive environmental disaster if a leak occurred while the
system was inoperable.
Turkey, 2008 – In August 2008, part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (“BTC”)
oil pipeline exploded.35 Initial government reports blamed mechanical
failure.36 In 2010 subsequent investigation by the U.S. indicated that the
explosion was actually the result of a cyberattack—once hackers achieved
access to the pipelines network they wreaked havoc on the pipelines
surveillance system; shut down alarms; and caused an explosion by super
pressurizing the crude oil in the pipeline.37 According to court filings in the
aftermath of the incident, “[t]he explosion caused more than 30,000 barrels
31. Heidi Vella, Fighting Cyber Crime in the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, OFFSHORE
TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.offshore-technology.com/digital-disruption/
cybersecurity/featurefighting-cyber-crime-in-the-offshore-oil-and-gas-industry-5692000/.
32. Hsieh, supra note 24.
33. David Kravets, Feds: Hacker Disabled Offshore Oil Platforms' Leak-Detection
System, WIRED (Mar. 18, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/03/feds-hacker-dis/.
34. Id.
35. 2008 Turkish Oil Pipeline Explosion may have been Stuxnet Precursor, HOMELAND
SEC. NEWS WIRE (Dec. 17, 2014) www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141217-2008turkish-oil-pipeline-explosion-may-have-been-stuxnet-precurso.
36. Hsieh, supra note 24.
37. Id.
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of oil to spill in an area above a water aquifer and cost BP and its partners
$US5 million [sic] a day in transit tariffs during the closure.”38 In addition to
private costs, the Republic of Azerbaijan suffered the highest losses,
approximately one billion dollars.39
Saudi Arabia, 2012 – In August 2012, hackers attacked the network of
Saudi Arabia’s oil and natural gas firm, Saudi Aramco, by launching the
Shamoon virus on the company’s network.40 In a matter of hours hackers
partially wiped or completed destroyed 35,000 computers.41 While the attack
did not result in a major explosion or oil spill, the ramifications were severe
and long-lasting.42 Almost instantaneously, a cyberattack put Saudi Aramco's
ability to supply ten percent of the world's oil at risk.43 Over the course of
two weeks, Saudi Aramco production “remained steady at 9.5 million barrels
per day…[b]ut the rest of the business was in turmoil,”44 as “[o]ne of the most
valuable companies on Earth was propelled back into 1970s technology,
using typewriters and faxes.”45 It took five months before the company was
back online.46 While Saudi Aramco did not publicize the exact cost incurred
as a result of the attack a company insider alleged, “[a]n attack of that size
would have easily bankrupted a smaller corporation.”47 The attackers
escaped identification and prosecution.48
South Korea, 2010 – In a non-targeted attack, a newly built, offshore rig
in transit from South Korea suffered a devastating security breach.49

38. Jordon Robertson & Michael Riley, Before Stuxnet, Refahiye Pipeline Blast in Turkey
Opened New Cyberwar Era, SUNDAY MORNING HERALD (December 12, 2014),
https://www.smh.com.au/world/before-stuxnet-refahiye-pipeline-blast-in-turkey-openednew-cyberwar-era-20141212-125nvy.html (citing James Marriott & Mika Minio-Paluello,
The Oil Road: A Journey to the Heart of the Energy Economy, VERSO (2012)).
39. Id. (internal citations omitted).
40. Christopher Bronk & Eneken Tikk-Ringas, The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco, 55
SURVIVAL 81, 81 (April 3, 2013), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.
2013.784468?scroll=top&needAccess=true.
41. Jose Pagliery, The Inside Story of the Biggest Hack in History, CNN BUSS. (Aug. 5,
2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/05/technology/aramco-hack/index.html.
42. Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, supra note 40.
43. Pagliery, supra note 41.
44. Id. (internal citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Hsieh, supra note 24. See also Sonja Swanbeck, Coast Guard Commandant
Addresses Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities on Offshore Oil Rigs, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
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Completely overwhelmed by malware, multiple computers malfunctioned,
taking out the blowout preventer system (“BOP”).50 It took nineteen days for
technicians to bring the rig back online.51 The consequences of the rig going
into operation with the malware still on the network could have been
catastrophic. Little information is available about the costs associated with
the incident or steps taken to prevent a similar incident from happening again.
African Coast, 2015 – The latest malicious cyberattack occurred when
hackers “caused an oil rig off the coast of Africa to tilt to one side, shutting
down production for a week as engineers worked to identify and fix the
issue.”52 Mike Ahmadi, global director for critical systems security at
Synopsys, was speaking to a researcher who pointed out the vulnerabilities
of the control systems responsible for managing the pontoons that keep
offshore rigs afloat.53 If a hacker infiltrated a pontoon control system they
could drain the “ballast on one side, causing the platform to tilt over in the
opposite direction;” the result of such an attack would cripple, if not
completely destroy, a rig. 54
In addition to malicious cyberattacks, there have also been recent nonmalicious attacks. Non-malicious or friendly attacks probe industry systems
to better understand vulnerabilities; some friendly attacks are intentional,
while some are the result of the inherent weaknesses of the system being
tested every time an employee connects his laptop to the platform’s network
to watch Netflix in his time off. An “incident was just cited this summer by
the US Coast Guard (USCG), where malware was mistakenly downloaded
onto a [mobile offshore drilling unit] MODU.”55 As a result, this malware
“impacted the dynamic positioning system which resulted in the
need for an emergency breakaway to avoid an accident,” Captain
Drew Tucci, Chief for the USCG Office of Ports and Facilities,
said. “That incident does not appear to have been from a targeted
STUDIES (Jun. 22, 2015), https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog/coast-guardcommandant-addresses-cybersecurity-vulnerabilities.
50. Id. A blowout preventer system is a series of safeguards on a rig which “shuts off the
valve leading underneath the machinery to stop any liquid from surfacing in a dangerous
explosion, or a kick,” The Role of the Blowout Preventer (BOP) in Drilling Operations,
KEYSTONE ENERGY TOOLS, https://www.keystoneenergytools.com/the-role-of-the-blowoutpreventer-bop-in-drilling-operations/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
51. Id.
52. Baker Donelson et al., supra note 10 (internal citations omitted).
53. Vella, supra note 31.
54. Id.
55. Hsieh, supra note 24.
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foreign company or terrorist organization that was trying to cause
an accident. It appears that it may have been caused simply by
poor cyber practices onboard the vessel.”56
These incidents on offshore platforms and in the oil and gas industry show
terrorists already possess the capability to infiltrate networks on offshore oil
platforms; moreover, how poor cyber protocols on platforms can result in an
accident equivalent to a terrorist attack. The issue of cybersecurity regulation
on offshore oil platforms is not just an issue for an industry or a company; it
is a universal issue that could result in a global threat. Even though “[t]he
industry is generally keen to play down the actual risk of such threats, . . . [i]t
is not unreasonable to believe there could be a kinetic response to a cyberattack that would see countries go to war . . . .”57
III. Recognition of the Threat
A. Limited Governmental Recognition
For cybersecurity regulation to pass through the House of Representatives
and Senate and get signed into law by the President, all levels of federal
government must understand the risk cyberterrorism poses to offshore
platforms; and the lack of regulation in place to protect them. Rear Adm. Paul
Thomas, Assistant Commandant for U.S. Coast Guard Prevention Policy,
with Brian Salerno, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
Director, in a panel addressing their regulatory stances and joint agency
initiatives for offshore safety proffered, when it comes to cybersecurity:
[T]he worst path is to wait for something bad to happen and
responsively pass a law, which would potentially be the most
expensive approach. I’ve been encouraging industry to start
tackling this issue because I believe if you wait until we have a
real cyber incident, it’s going to be fast, painful and expensive.58
Yet, the worst path, according to Rear Adm. Thomas is the exact path that
is being taken. While the federal government is supportive of cultivating
industry guidance not one branch of the federal government is willing to put
56. Id.
57. Vella, supra note 31 (internal citations omitted).
58. Lt. Jodie Knox, 5/21/2015: 2015 Offshore Technology Conference – Complexity of
Operations and Cyber, COAST GUARD MARITIME COMMONS (May 21, 2015),
http://mariners.coastguard.dodlive.mil/2015/05/21/5212015-2015-offshore-technologyconference-complexity-of-operations-and-cyber/.
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the force of law behind the guidance. It is not just Rear Adm. Paul Thomas
who is calling for action in the oil and gas industry with little effect. Former
President Obama and President Trump have both recognized the danger that
cyberterrorism poses to the nation. President Barack Obama, during National
Cybersecurity Awareness Month in 2016, emphasized “[k]eeping cyberspace
secure is a matter of national security, and in order to ensure we can reap the
benefits and utility of technology while minimizing the dangers and threats
it presents, we must continue to make cybersecurity a top priority.”59 The
Trump Administration, while advocating for significant deregulation of the
industry, even recognized “[t]he Federal Government has the responsibility
to . . . to ensure America has the best cybersecurity in the world. Failures to
prioritize cybersecurity by both government and industry have left our Nation
less secure.”60
While limited outcry for change has come from executive branch
politicians (and those responsible for industry oversight), there is little
movement from the House of Representatives or the Senate to tackle the big
cybersecurity issues that are putting national security and environmental
sustainability at risk. Stated more directly, the “U.S. still lacks regulation on
cybersecurity standards in the oil and gas industry, the way it has for nuclear,
power, and chemicals” in the past.61 There is no question that the industry as
a whole is not adequately prepared for a coordinated cyberattack on offshore
platforms; and the federal government as a whole is not acting to fix the
threat.
B. Industry Recognition
The oil and gas industry recognized a need to modernize cybersecurity
protocols over the last six years. However, unlike government, where
regulation can remain stuck in a political log jam, industry has the ability to
swiftly enact change. Despite this, industry is facing its own challenges in
trying to strengthen cybersecurity systems and protocols. A 2017 study done
by the Ponemon Institute demonstrates this fact. The Institute surveyed 377
individuals from the oil and gas industry who oversee cybersecurity

59. Proclamation No. 9508, 81 Fed. Reg. 69, 371 (Sept. 30, 2016).
60. Grant Schneider, President Trump Unveils America’s First Cybersecurity Strategy in
15 Years, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
articles/president-trump-unveils-americas-first-cybersecurity-strategy-15-years/.
61. Tsvetana Parakova, Oil Industry Neglected Cybersecurity During the Downturn,
OILPRICE.COM (Apr. 12, 2018, 5:00PM), https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/WorldNews/Oil-Industry-Neglected-Cybersecurity-During-The-Downturn.html.
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operations for their employers.62 The survey found the following: (1)
“[s]ixty-eight percent of respondents said their organization had experienced
at least one cyber compromise;” (2) “[a] total of 67 percent of respondents
believe the risk level to industrial control systems over the past few years has
substantially increased because of cyber threats;” (3) “[s]ixty-six percent
believe that oil and gas companies are benefiting from digitalization, but that
it has also significantly increased cyber risks;” (4) “[o]nly 61 percent of
respondents say their organization has the internal expertise to manage cyber
threats.”63 These numbers illustrate the disconnect in the oil and gas industry
between taking action and feeling disheartened with the limited resources
available for such a complex problem.
In discussing cyber threats offshore, the former Control System Security
Manager for National Oilwell Varco noted, “[d]rilling systems are designed
around the theory of an isolated network – that the hundreds of miles of ocean
and the physical barriers to get to the rig constituted sufficient security to
make sure they couldn’t be compromised.”64 The theory that offshore oil
platforms were an impenetrable offshore network meant companies spent
neither corporate time or money on improving cybersecurity or creating
cybersecurity protocols to keep pace with advancing technology. There is no
longer validity in the assumption cybersecurity is built into every system on
an offshore platform. In 2017 Deloitte found, “[t]he oil and gas production
operation ranks highest on cyber vulnerability in upstream operations, mainly
because of its legacy asset base, which was not built for cybersecurity but has
been retrofitted and patched in bits and pieces over the years, and lack of
monitoring tools on existing networks.”65 Regarding offshore facilities,
“approximately 42 percent . . . worldwide have been operational for more
than 15 years, fewer than half of [oil and gas] companies use monitoring tools
on their networks, and of those companies that have these tools, only 14
percent have fully operational security monitoring centers.”66 These numbers
are unacceptable. If a competent hacker finds an exploitable weakness across

62. PONEMON INST. LLC, The State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Gas Industry: United
States (Feb. 2017) https://news.usa.siemens.biz/sites/siemensusa.newshq.businesswire.com/
files/press_release/additional/Cyber_readiness_in_Oil__Gas_Final_4.pdf.
63. Id.
64. Hsieh, supra note 24.
65. Anshu Mittal et al., Protecting the Connected Barrels Cybersecurity for Upstream
Oil and Gas, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (June 26, 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/
industry/oil-and-gas/cybersecurity-in-oil-and-gas-upstream-sector.html.
66. Id.
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multiple platforms approximately fifty-five percent that do not use
monitoring tools risk having a Deepwater Horizon level blowout.
Furthermore, for all the recent recognition cybersecurity has gotten from
industry insiders’ companies are still not spending money on upgrading and
updating protocols. “Two prominent security consultant firms estimate that
energy companies, ranging from drillers to pipeline operators to utilities,
invest less than 0.2 percent of their revenue in cyber security [sic].”67 For
perspective, “that’s at least a third less than the corresponding figure for
banks and other financial institutions.”68 While there has been an uptick in
cybersecurity spending by these companies the money put towards the
problems has done little to actually curb the amount of attacks that are
occurring throughout the industry and on offshore oil platforms.
Additionally, “what makes the lack of investment even more worrisome is
that the number of hacker groups targeting the energy sector is soaring. [One
company is] tracking at least 140 groups, up from 87 in 2015, some with
links to foreign countries.”69 The threat to platforms will not go away and it
will not dissipate. The oil and gas industry recognizes the next big threat to
its platforms but it is not doing enough to stop the threat from becoming a
reality.
IV. Prior Additions to Federal Regulation Concerning Offshore Oil
Platforms
A. Protection Against Other Types of Terrorism
A large body of international laws and regulations allows companies
operating offshore oil rigs to protect those rigs from terrorist attack. As
previously discussed, offshore oil platforms have long been an appealing
target for terrorist attacks.70 International law, specifically maritime law and
the law of the seas, outline and clarify the legal avenues that companies can
use to protect their rigs from external and internal terrorist attacks. 71 First,
international law protects offshore platforms from terrorist attacks in the
following way.
67. Naureen S. Malik, Energy Companies Aren't Doing Much to Defend Against Soaring
Cyber Attacks, BLOOMBERG (April 30, 2018, 5:32 AM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2018-04-27/-cyber-blindspot-threatens-energy-companies-spending-toolittle.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Harel, supra note 17.
71. Id.
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Although vessels of all [nation]states are entitled to exercise
innocent passage in a state's territorial sea [500-meter-wide safety
zone] the law of the sea provides coastal states with the authority
to take measures to promote safety and security within that area.
States may use this authority for preventing terrorist attacks on
offshore platforms located within the territorial sea.72
Second, international law provides states the “legal authority necessary for
protecting offshore platforms from attack.”73 Basically coastal states have the
ability to “invoke the right of self-defense to justify restrictions on navigation
near its offshore platforms” under international law if the platform is under
the threat of imminent attack.74 When it comes to physical assaults on
offshore oil platforms owners and operators can look to international law for
clear regulation that guide a company’s ability to protect themselves from
impending attack. There is no regulatory equivalent regarding a cyber
assault. There is no clear regulation at the international level (or within the
United States) that explicitly states the rights and responsibilities a company
has to protect against cyberattack the way that international law explicitly
outlines how a company can protect itself against a physical assault.
B. Regulatory Reaction to Deepwater Horizon
Following Deepwater Horizon, also known as the Macondo Disaster, the
federal government inundated the industry with regulation to prevent another
catastrophe, but the new regulations did not encompass cybersecurity. In the
middle of the disaster, “with the Macondo well still gushing untold millions
of barrels of oil into the Gulf and in the midst of an unprecedented six-month
deep-water drilling moratorium prompted by the blowout, President Obama
made it clear that the post-Macondo regulatory world would be a very
different place.”75 One of the first moves was restructuring the organizations
that govern the regulation of offshore platforms, which was already starting
at the time of the disaster.
[T]he acting Secretary of the Interior, announced the separation of
the responsibilities performed by the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), the
entity that had replaced the disgraced MMS in June 2010 by
72. Id. at 140.
73. Id. at 183.
74. Id.
75. Christopher M. Hannan, “Lost in Their Own Streets” and At Sea: The New Regulatory
Reality After Macondo, 92 TUL. L. REV. 991, 995 (2018).
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Salazar's [Secretary of the Interior’s] order, into three new
separate organizations: Office of Natural Resources Revenue
(ONRR, an entirely separate office under the Assistant Secretary
for Policy, Management and Budget responsible for revenue and
royalty concerns), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM), and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(BSEE).76
The result being the regulation of platforms at the federal level falls under
the regulatory umbrella of the United States Coast Guard (“USCG”) and the
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”).77 As a
necessary and logical starting point, “the USCG and BSEE…entered into
nine separate Memoranda of Understanding and Memoranda of
Agreement.”78 These agreements provide “a bird's eye view of how the
USCG and BSEE approach their roles in regulating OCS [Outer Continental
Shelf] activities and also highlight some of the inherent overlaps and gray
areas in the new regulatory regime.”79 While the USCG is the overarching
governing body, the BSEE is designed to “be responsible for safety and
environmental enforcement functions;” these functions include “the
authority to permit activities, inspect, investigate, summon witnesses and
produce evidence: levy penalties; cancel or suspend activities; and oversee
safety, response and removal preparedness.”80 While there are a number of
overlapping areas of governance, areas with unclear lines of authority have
caused confusion and left gaps in the regulatory framework. Based on the
regulatory framework post-Macondo any new cybersecurity regulation will
likely go through or be monitored by the USCG and the BSEE. Increasing
the regulation of offshore drilling platforms was a natural move on the part
of the government following Deepwater Horizon to prevent a similar
disaster. Creating or reinforcing cybersecurity regulation following multiple
cyberattacks across the world should be the natural next step before a cyberMacondo occurs.

76. Id. at 1023.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1003.
79. Id.
80. Reorganization of Title 30: Bureaus of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and
Ocean Energy Management, 76 Fed. Reg. 64431, 64432 (Oct. 18, 2011).
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V. Inadequacies of Existing Regulations and Industry Guidance Concerning
Cybersecurity of Offshore Oil Platforms
While international, federal, and state law all work together to regulate
offshore oil platforms, most of the work that is currently taking place
concerning cybersecurity regulation occurs at the federal level. An
examination of what regulation is in existence at the federal level, that many
inaccurately assume will adequately protect platforms from offshore attacks,
is important. One scholar argues:
Notwithstanding the tide of regulators’ informal literature on
cybersecurity, there are currently no specific, discrete
cybersecurity regulations for either offshore or inland vessel
operations. However, existing regulatory frameworks likely
encompass issues of cybersecurity for offshore and inland vessel
operators, even if they do not specifically address cybersecurity
as such.81
It is not enough to say that existing regulations encompass issues of
cybersecurity for offshore oil platforms. Cybersecurity is a complex issue
that that requires an independent regulatory framework. The following
sections address why existing regulations—including Maritime Security
Regulations, Best Available and Safest Technologies Program, and industry
guidance—is not enough to ensure the cybersecurity of America’s platforms.
A. Maritime Security Regulations
Baker Donelson asserts that the most relevant body of regulation, the
Maritime Security Regulations (“MARSEC Regulations”), that stem from
the Maritime Transportation Security Act (“MTSA”), cover requirements for
the cybersecurity of offshore oil platforms. This assertion of the Baker
Donelson firm is not accurate.
As it stands, MARSEC Regulations, are applicable “to all vessels
(including MODUs) and OCS facilities in/on the waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States”82 The MARSEC Regulations came into
existence with three primary aims. Those aims include:
1) To implement portions of the maritime security regime required
by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, as codified
in 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701;
81. Baker Donelson et al., supra note 10.
82. Hannan, supra note 75, at 1023.
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(2) To align, where appropriate, the requirements of domestic
maritime security regulations with the international maritime
security standards in the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Chapter XI–2) and the International
Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities, parts A and
B, adopted on 12 December 2002; and
(3) To ensure, security arrangements are as compatible as possible
for vessels trading internationally.83
The third aim of the MARSEC Regulations is the most important in this
context. It is applicable to all vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States:84 Some argue, that in the context of the statute, the requirement to
“ensure security arrangements” includes the need to ensure cybersecurity
arrangements, and furthermore vessels include offshore oil platforms.
Because the provision is inclusive of cybersecurity no other regulation is
necessary.
Additional language that allegedly includes cybersecurity includes the
need for offshore oil platforms owners to:
“[e]nsure that security systems and equipment are installed and
maintained” on their vessels and facilities and designate a
qualified.” Company Security Officer (CSO) tasked with ensuring
various aspects of vessel or facility security, including “[s]ecurity
equipment and systems and their operational limitations” and
“[r]elevant
international
conventions,
codes,
and
recommendations,” which now include specific codes regarding
cybersecurity.85
Under the Donelson theory, rig operators read “security systems” to
include cybersecurity despite the complete lack of further guidance that
would indicate what the installation or maintenance of a cybersecurity system
involves. Furthermore, Vessels Reporting Requirements 33 C.F.R. §104.235
requires the vessel security officer to keep records of different incidents
concerning safety equipment: since the UCSG defined security “‘incidents’86
83. Purpose 33 C.F.R. § 101.100 (2019).
84. Id.
85. Hannan, supra note 75, at 1023.
86. The USCG defines a cyber incident as “[a]n occurrence that actually or potentially
results in adverse consequences to an information system or the information that the system
processes, stores, or transmits and that may require a response action to mitigate the
consequences.” U.S. COAST GUARD, CG-5P Policy Letter No. 08-16, REPORTING SUSPICIOUS
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and ‘breaches’87 to specifically include cybersecurity breaches/incidents”88
in the reporting requirement the conclusion that follows is that all regulations
related to security must be read to include the necessary cybersecurity
systems.
While it is tempting for the offshore oil community to try to read
MARSEC regulations to include cybersecurity into provisions concerning
general security matters it is not appropriate to do so. A plain text reading of
the statute does not lead to the conclusion that cybersecurity is included in
the meaning. The only indication that the statute includes cybersecurity
comes from codes in a niche piece of regulation that differentiates between
security breaches/incidents and cybersecurity breaches/incidents. Even if the
statute is viewed in isolation, the argument that cybersecurity is appropriately
grounded under the general security arm of the regulation is not appropriate
due to the complex nature of the systems involved in cybersecurity. A new
protocol must go beyond simple reporting requirement and read-ins.
Companies deserve to know the exact measures they are responsible for
taking to try and preempt a cyberattack. Companies cannot read into
regulation requirements for cybersecurity systems that are not explicit. There
is a difference between the mandatory security measures that MARSEC
explicitly includes and a read in of cybersecurity regulations that gives
companies no guidance as to what elements a cybersecurity system needs to
include. This reading of MARSEC Regulations is the closest regulatory
framework for cybersecurity of offshore oil platforms that exists at the
federal level, and it is in no way adequate to be the governing regulation.
B. Best Available and Safest Technologies Program
The second area of federal regulation that encompasses cybersecurity of
offshore oil platforms is the Best Available and Safest Technologies
(“BAST”) Program under the BSEE. The BAST Program comes under What

ACTIVITY AND BREACHES OF SECURITY, 7 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://homeport.uscg.mil/
Lists/Content/Attachments/2676/CG-5P%20Policy%20Letter%2008-16_3.pdf.
87. A cybersecurity breach is the “Unauthorized access to data, applications, services,
networks and/or devices, by-passing their underlying security mechanisms. A cybersecurity
breach that may rise to the level of a reportable [MTSA] security breach occurs when an
individual, an entity, or an application illegitimately enters a private or confidential
Information Technology perimeter of a MTSA-regulated facility or vessel, Maritime Critical
Infrastructure/Key Resources, or industrial control system such as Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition systems, including but not limited to terminal operating systems, global
positioning systems, and cargo management systems.” Id.
88. Hannan, supra note 75, at 1024.
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must I do to protect health, safety, property, and the environment? 30 C.F.R.
§ 250.107. The BAST Program:
establishes a process for fulfilling the provisions of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), Amendments . . . which
requires offshore operators to use BAST whenever practical on all
exploration, development, and production operations when failure
of equipment would have a significant effect or impact on safety,
health, or the environment.89
BSEE further acknowledges that in accordance with the OCSLA, BSEE
has the ability to initiate a BAST Determination Process to evaluate safety,
health or environmental concerns.90 Based on the cyberthreats and attacks on
platforms and pipelines over the last several years, a cyberattack on an
offshore oil platform could constitute a significant threat worthy of the
initiation of a BAST Determination Process. BAST may be the best means
for creating regulation. A BAST determination by the BSEE would require
offshore oil platform operators to “use technology that meets the BAST
Program performance requirement(s) on new and, wherever practicable,
existing operations.”91 A BAST Program determination would give
companies a clear idea of what technology is necessary to ensure
cybersecurity of offshore platforms. Another perk is the process focuses on
“the establishment of performance level(s).”92 Establishing performance
levels rather than a set standard allows a fluidity to requirements that matches
the fluid and evolving nature of cyberthreats. A BAST Determination
Process involves seeking guidance of government, industry, and academia
and takes relevant economic factors into account.93 This level of stakeholder
involvement in creating regulation creates an automatic buy in for all
stakeholders. Companies in the oil and gas industry could not as easily flaunt
a regulation that they helped develop. While BAST is one of the best options
for creating cybersecurity protocols the federal government has not used
89. Best Available and Safest Technologies (BAST), BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVTL.
ENF’T,
https://www.bsee.gov/what-we-do/offshore-regulatory-programs/emergingtechnologies/BAST (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
90. What must I do to protect health, safety, property, and the environment?, 30 C.F.R. §
250.107(c)-(d) (2019).
91. BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, BEST AVAILABLE AND
SAFEST TECHNOLOGIES (BAST) DETERMINATION PROCESS, 12 (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee.gov/files/fact-sheet/bsee-bast-determination-process-finalnovember-2015.pdf.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id.
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BAST to promulgate such regulations as of this writing. An outstanding
option for regulatory framework is completely inadequate to secure offshore
oil platforms from cyberattack if not used.
C. Position of Industry Regulators
As noted, offshore oil platform operators currently use MARSEC as the
basis for a federal regulatory framework when looking for guidance; but
companies in the industry can also look to the stances of the federal regulators
who are responsible for the governance of regulation of offshore oil
platforms, specifically the USCG and the BSEE. For its part, the USCG has
“expressly noted that existing regulations may encompass cybersecurity
concerns and has called for public comments on ‘how to identify and mitigate
potential vulnerabilities to cyber-dependent systems’ in the marine
industry.”94 This stance, while understandable, is not in the best interest of
companies that look to the USCG for guidance.
The BSEE “has largely followed the USCG's lead in this area.”95 That said,
the USCG has put forth to the BSEE—due to the shared regulatory authority
of the agencies—“the issue of whether BSEE's Safety and Environmental
Management Systems (SEMS) regulations should expressly include
cybersecurity
provisions.”96 Additionally,
the
BSEE
“formally
acknowledge[s] that it is certainly appropriate to factor cyber safety into your
overall SEMS planning.”97 These are the two main agencies responsible for
ensuring the safe operation of offshore oil platforms. Based on the comments
and stances of the USCG and the BSEE the use of the existing regulatory
framework is simply stop-gap regulation to push companies into having a
stop-gap cybersecurity protocol that mollifies lawmakers and regulators
alike.
D. Industry Guidance
Several organizations and agencies, prominent authorities in the offshore
oil and gas industry, created cybersecurity protocols to guide companies in
the creation of their own protocols and policies. These protocols are
important to the furtherance of future regulations and to evaluate the current
tools available to companies.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Hannan, supra note 75, at 1024 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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There are three primary sets of guidance. The first, is the Interim
Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management (“IMCO”). This four-page
set of guidelines from the International Maritime Organization is designed to
“provide high-level recommendations on maritime cyber risk management
to safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyberthreats and
vulnerabilities. The guidelines also include functional elements that support
effective cyber risk management.”98 The problem with this industry guidance
is that is designed for shipping not the oil and gas industry, and not offshore
oil platforms. As a result, it provides little more than broad strokes of insight
that can tangentially provide suggestions for offshore platforms. One size
does not fit all, guidance for shipping is not going to provide adequate
guidance for an offshore oil platform that runs completely different software
and is susceptible to completely different threats.
The second primary guidance is the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology (“NIST”) Framework. The Framework stems from the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (“CEA”).99 CEA updated the role
of NIST “to include identifying and developing cybersecurity risk
frameworks for voluntary use by critical infrastructure owners and
operators.”100 It “focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity
activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the organization’s
risk management processes;” but, it “is not a one-size-fits-all approach to
managing cybersecurity for critical infrastructure.101 Organizations will
continue to face unique risks and use unique technologies that will cause
deviations from the standard framework.102 Since the Framework was
released in February of 2014 industries began to integrate it by creating
industry-focused framework profiles.103 The USCG worked with the oil and
98. INT'L MAR. ORG., Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management
Systems (July 5, 2017), http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_
Security/Documents/MSC-FAL.1-Circ.3%20-%20Guidelines%20On%20Maritime%20
Cyber%20Risk%20Management%20(Secretariat).pdf.
99. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY V (Version 1.1, 2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Id at VI.
102. Id.
103. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, MARITIME BULK LIQUIDS TRANSFER, OFFSHORE
OPERATIONS, AND PASSENGER VESSEL CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK PROFILES V (Version 3,
2017), http://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-PreventionPolicy-CG-5P/Inspections-Compliance-CG-5PC-/Office-of-Port-FacilityCompliance/Domestic-Ports-Division/cybersecurity/.
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gas industry to develop a Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Offshore
Operations (“CFPFOP”).104 The CFPFPOP is comprehensive it “defines the
desired minimum state of cybersecurity by identifying the minimum set of
Cybersecurity Framework Categories and Subcategories for each of the
twelve Mission Objectives required to conduct Offshore Operations in a
more secure manner.”105 The existence of the CFPFPOP is a dramatic step
toward giving companies who operate offshore oil platforms comprehensive
guidelines to establish cybersecurity protocols. BUT the NIST Framework106
and the CFPFPOP107 are completely voluntary and are not legally binding.
Furthermore, both NIST and the CFPFPOP are relatively new, released in
2014 and 2017 respectively, based on spending reports of offshore oil
platform owners108 they will not voluntarily spend the money to implement
such a comprehensive plan without evidence that the framework actually
helps prevent cyberattacks.
The third and final guidance comes from the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS), “the USCG’s primary third-party regulatory enforcement delegate
whose standards have been widely incorporated by reference in existing
USCG regulations.” 109 The ABS CyberSafety series is a five volume and
highly detailed “management program for asset owners to apply best practice
approaches to cyber security, automated systems safety, data integrity and
software verification.”110 Three volumes are specific to offshore vessel
operations.111 The most important parts of the series, specifically the volumes
concerning offshore vessel operations, are the guidelines that layout the
procedure for companies to obtain an “ABS CyberSafety Management
System Certificate (CMSC, for a company's cybersecurity management
system) and Certificate of Cyber Compliance (CCC, for specific vessels or
facilities),” certifying that their vessel operations are cyber secure.112

104. Id.
105. Id. at Appendix B (B-1).
106. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 99.
107. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, supra note 103, at Title Page.
108. Naureen S. Malik, supra note 67.
109. Baker Donelson et al., supra note 10.
110. Press Release, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), ABS Expands Comprehensive
Industry-First Cyber System Guidance (Sept. 6, 2016), https://ww2.eagle.org/en/news/pressroom/ABS-Expands-Comprehensive-Industry-First-Cyber-System-Guidance.html.
111. Id. Out of the five volumes, Volumes 1, 2, and 3 apply to offshore operations and
industries.
112. Baker Donelson et al., supra note 10.
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The ABS CyberSafety certificate
“[is] not [intended to be] required as a condition for ABS Class,”
but is offered as “a useful indication of the due diligence applied
by owners to better prepare for cybersecurity concerns affecting
ships, offshore assets and their associated shoreside facilities.”
This certification process involves annual assessments “when
there are major cyber-enabled, safety-related networked system
configuration changes,” including (without limitation) “majorversion number operating system or firmware changes in either
OT or IT; control system changeouts in safety-critical systems; or
combined configuration changes between or among two or more
systems that control safety-critical systems”; and otherwise
during multi-year class survey events. The assessment process
focuses on documentation of a cyber safety management system,
as well as extensive record-keeping “of all modifications,
maintenance and system security or configuration updates and
upgrades, including any outstanding help desk tickets or
vendor/integrator repair or maintenance requirements, and any
insecurities or breaches.”113
Additionally the three-tiered certification program focuses on nine areas of
competency: (1) Exercise Best Practices, (2) Build the Security Organization,
(3) Provision for Employee Awareness and Training, (4) Perform Risk
Assessment, (5) Provide Perimeter Defense, (6) Prepare for Incident
Response and Recovery, (7) Provide Physical Security, (8) Execute Access
Management and (9) Maintain Asset Management.114 This program, if
converted into a regulatory standard, could easily be the cornerstone of the
necessary federal regulation that would secure offshore oil platforms from
cyberattacks. If all companies were to subject themselves to a standard
similar to the one promulgated by ABS, then companies could find
reassurance, knowing that active steps have been taken to secure platforms.
E. Conclusion
In the above explanations of available frameworks for cybersecurity of
offshore oil platforms, industry and government alike must recognize that no
regulation currently forces companies to act to secure their cyber welfare.
There is no guarantee that companies will read cybersecurity into MARSEC
113. Id. (internal citations omitted).
114. Id.
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regulation; follow the NIST Framework or CFPFPOP; or follow the guidance
of NGOs or BSEE-affiliated regulatory advisors such as ABS. Deepwater
Horizon clearly showed that the oil and gas industry will not self-regulate
when profits are at stake.115 BP “was less than meticulous about safety (other
people and their property, that is) while it and its industry effectively vetoed
government safeguards that might have prevented the explosion.”116
Academics argue, “[c]orporate self-regulation without effective government
oversight will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents with the offshore
oil exploration industry.”117 There is nothing to support that corporate selfregulation on its own will adequately reduce the risk of cyberattacks on
offshore oil platforms. Companies have guidance at their disposal, but until
this guidance has the force of law behind it the federal government is leaving
the security of the nation’s platforms to chance.
VI. Moving Forward to Secure Cybersecurity Regulation
There is a lot of potential industry guidance available for the federal
government to turn into mandatory cybersecurity regulation of offshore oil
platforms. One available option is use existing MARSE regulations to create
a floor for what companies need to do to secure rigs. A second option is to
leave the regulation to industry best practice and standard. Industry practice
can come from NGOs, ABS, NIST, or USCG. All the previously described
available industry standard has yet to inspire either the Houser of
Representatives or Senate to put forth cybersecurity regulation for offshore
oil platforms. Other aspects of critical infrastructure such as the power grid118

115. Coral Davenport, Washington Rolls Back Safety Rules Inspired by Deepwater
Horizon Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/
climate/offshore-drilling-safety-deepwater-horizon.html. See also Terry Waghorn, Trump
Wants More Offshore Drilling And Less Regulation – That's A Recipe For Disaster, FORBES
(Jun. 6, 2018, 12:46pm), https://www.forbes.com/sites/terrywaghorn/2018/06/06/trumpwants-more-offshore-drilling-and-less-regulation-thats-a-recipe-for-disaster/#2a46bd682c30.
116. Sheldon Richman, Self-Regulation in the Corporate State: The BP Spill Which system
failed?, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (https://fee.org/articles/self-regulation-in-the-corporatestate-the-bp-spill/
117. Naama Hassan, Deep Water Offshore Oil Exploration Regulation: The Need for a
Global Environmental Regulation Regime 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 277,
277 (2013).
118. The Conversation, Cybersecurity of the Power Grid: A Growing Challenge, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Feb. 24, 2017, 4:03 PM), https://www.usnews.com/
news/national-news/articles/2017-02-24/cybersecurity-of-the-power-grid-a-growingchallenge

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

728

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 4

and the water sector119 are legally bound by specific federal cybersecurity
regulation or combination of federal and state cybersecurity regulation.
While other critical infrastructure has detailed, infrastructure specific, legally
binding regulation; offshore platforms do not. This translates to offshore
platforms being at higher risk for attack.
A. Determining the Appropriate Regulation
The USCG in 2015 expected industry to begin to bear the brunt of the
burden in protecting themselves without stated governmental standards.120
Three years later, “the recent spate of industry standards issued by high
profile maritime governance and standards bodies may very well be destined
for incorporation into the” Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”).121 Any
future regulation must balance the government’s interest in guidance and
oversight against the risk that static rules will become obsolete.122 Any
regulation that does not strike a balance runs the risk of forcing companies
into a hole that they cannot get out of, where regulation causes companies to
“focus their defenses on a limited number of types of attacks or business
activities to the detriment of other existing or emerging needs.”123 There is
also a chance that such rules might create an exploitable window into
industry defenses, resulting in unintended consequences.124
The best thing that the federal government can do to secure offshore oil
platforms from cyberattack is turn the ABS standards (set forth in the
CyberSafety program) and the CFPFPOP (based on the NIST Framework)
into legally binding regulation overseen by the USCG that all offshore oil
platforms must follow without exception. While the CyberSafety program
encompasses more than just offshore oil platforms, at this time the USCG
119. JUDITH H. GERMANO, CYBERSECURITY RISK & RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WATER SECTOR,
16-17 (American Water Works Association 2018), https://www.awwa.org/
Portals/0/AWWA/Government/AWWACybersecurityRiskandResponsibility.pdf?ver=201812-05-123319-013.
120. Knox, supra note 58.
121. Baker Donelson et al., supra note 10.
122. Nick Snow, Use More Collaborative Cybersecurity Approach, Groups Urge
Government, OIL & GAS JOURNAL (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.ogj.com/articles/print/
volume-116/issue-11a/general-interest/use-more-collaborative-cybersecurity-approachgroups-urge-government.html.
123. NATURAL GAS COUNCIL & OIL AND NATURAL GAS SECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL,
Defense-In-Depth: Cybersecurity in the Natural Gas & Industry, 27 (2018),
http://naturalgascouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Defense-in-Depth-Cybersecurityin-the-Natural-Gas-and-Oil-Industry.pdf.
124. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/2

2019]

Cybersecurity and Offshore Oil

729

should limit implementation to offshore oil platforms to better integrate the
CFPFPOP (which is specific to offshore operations). By moving toward the
ABS and NIST standard mandating that companies obtain some level of
certification concerning their cyber protocols, the government would be
instituting much more than just a floor for companies to get above in terms
of cybersecurity. In doing so, the government would help protect the United
States and its people from another incident comparable to Deepwater
Horizon. The best form of regulation is one that successfully outlines a riskmanagement procedure that allows companies to establish effective defenses
for cyberthreats. Offshore oil platforms are a necessary part of our critical
infrastructure; “[w]hile cybersecurity problems are inevitable, if something
is deemed a critical infrastructure for the country, it needs to be treated as
such and subject to competent oversight by qualified government regulators
to help reduce the costs and consequences of future incidents.”125 It is time
to move pass industry standard and implement federal regulation that holds
offshore oil platform owners to a higher standard.
B. Implementation of Future Regulation
If the federal government integrated industry standard into the C.F.R. the
oil and gas industry must then proceed to implement it. For the successful
implementation of regulation to occur there must be support from the oil and
gas industry. It is rare for companies to want to take on more regulation;
“[m]any industries tend to favor self-regulation because it helps keep
government away, reduces their costs and allows them to keep any problems
‘inside the family’ and away from public view.”126 Meeting regulatory
thresholds is expensive for companies; it takes time, money and manpower.
Garnering the support of the oil and gas industry “will depend on appropriate
government financial incentives to make compliance costs more
palatable.”127 The goal of regulation from the perspective of the industry must
be “to strengthen these companies and secure their growth, not hamstring
industry or penalize their profits.”128 The more industry has a hand in the
creation of the regulation, the more likely it is that the industry will support
the new regulation.
125. Richard Forno & Ann Hobson, Should the Government Require Companies to Meet
Cybersecurity Standards for Critical Infrastructure?, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov.12,
2018, 11:53 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-the-government-require-companiesto-meet-cybersecurity-standards-for-critical-infrastructure-1542041617.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Assuming, that the industry assents to the regulations, the next hurdle is
the movement of deregulation that is ongoing under the current executive
administration. It is the stated goal of President Trump to “reduce the size,
scope, and cost of federal regulation.”129 While it might be a hard battle to
implement new federal regulation under the current administration, there is
no better time or place to do it. Furthermore, leaving better regulation
practices as a long-term goal for a more pro-regulation presidency is not an
unreasonable alternative. Implementing change at the international level
takes too long, and state-by-state regulations would disserve the purpose of
creating a uniform standard.
The last hurdle that directly impacts the adoption of suggested regulation
is the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (“NTTA”).
Specifically, section 12(d) of the NTTA requires that federal agencies,
including the USCG, consult with industry groups and adopt industry
standards where consistent with their regulatory mission.”130 The upside of
adopting the ABS CyberSafety protocols and the NIST Framework
CFPFPOP as a means of protecting offshore oil platforms is that the ABS—
which seeks industry input—and the NIST Framework—established with the
help of the industry—represents the standard of the industry, and stands a
better chance of surviving the NTTA’s requirements.
In spite of the hurdles outlined above to potential regulation, the proposed
framework can still become law. What will determine if it does become law
is the determination of individuals who see the danger of doing nothing.
Doing nothing, and allowing platform operators to “self-regulate,” while the
federal government stands ideally by is no longer an option that the American
electorate should tolerate.
VII. Moving Forward—Regulation Without Reward
There is an understandable apprehension from companies about spending
large amounts of money on a constantly-evolving problem. Cyberattacks can
strengthen and morph in a matter of minutes, and competent cybersecurity
systems that protect offshore oil platforms can be costly, with no guarantee
that the system will stop every threat. The industry must remember that the
costs of a cybersecurity defense protocol will inevitably be less expensive

129. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on Deregulation (Dec. 14,
2017)
(transcript
available
online
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-deregulation/)
130. Hannan, supra note 75, at 1025-26.
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than a loss of life or significant environmental damage that can occur when
an attack rises to the level of Deepwater Horizon Disaster.
Deepwater Horizon contains many examples of the dangers of not
maintaining an offshore oil rig. As a result of the current state of cybersecurity insurance policies, it is likely that similar issues will occur if a
Deepwater Horizon-scale disaster is the result of a breakdown in
cybersecurity. The company who holds the vessel as an asset will likely be
the only one who covers any damage. There is a higher likelihood that insures
may be willing to cover more of platforms cybersecurity risks if federal
regulation is enacted.
A. Insurance Coverage
Most insurance policies of offshore oil platforms include liability and
exclusion clauses if attacks occur as a result of cyberattacks.131 “First, many
traditional marine insurance policies (hull and machinery, protection and
indemnity, marine CGL, and specifically the Institute Cyber Attack
Exclusion Clause (CL380)) often exclude liability for damages arising from
cyberattacks and risks.”132 This is an example of a standard clause:
1.1 Subject only to Clause 1.2 below, in no case shall this
insurance cover loss damage liability or expense directly caused
by or contributed to by or arising from the use or operation, as a
means for inflicting harm, of any computer, computer system,
computer software program, malicious code, computer virus or
process or any electronic system.
1.2 Where this clause is endorsed on policies covering risks of
war, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or civil strife
arising therefrom, or any hostile act by or against a belligerent
power, or terrorism or any person acting from a political motive,
Clause 1.1. Shall not operate to exclude losses (which would
otherwise be covered) arising from the use of any computer,
computer system computer software program, or any electronic
system in the launch and/or guidance system and/or firing
mechanism of any weapon or missile.133

131. Jennifer L. Gibbs, Cyber Risks and Insurance in the Marine Industry, INSURANCE
LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.zelle.com/news-publications-445.html.
132. Hannan, supra note 75, at 1023.
133. Gibbs, supra note 131.
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Thus, if there is an attack on an offshore platform that is insured by a
policy with a cyber-exclusion clause, all damages fall to the company. If
the company is not able to pay, the government will then shoulder the cost
of recovery and cleanup. Furthermore, there is no support from insurance
companies for environmental cleanup, there is little that companies, even
multi-national conglomerates, can do when potentially facing billions of
dollars in damages if a cyberattack took place.
Second, “if an involved company's cybersecurity program is so illadvised or nonexistent, in the face of many available industry standards and
so much regulatory guidance about the importance of cybersecurity, it
could arguably render a vessel ‘cyber unseaworthy’ – which in turn might
void any insurance coverage that might otherwise apply.” 134 The standard
that would make a vessel “cyber unseaworthy” has yet to be articulated.
The assumption is that vessels need some level of cybersecurity, but the
exact level is unknown. Industry standard helps to articulate the
cybersecurity threshold companies must meet; but, once again, that does
little to articulate a threshold as to what an insurer would look for in a stable
company. Even further, “an incompetent cybersecurity program could
potentially constitute negligence necessarily within the privity and
knowledge of the vessel's owner, which could potentially void the owner's
right to invoke limitation of or exoneration from liability.” 135
Insurance companies are almost as ill-prepared to handle a cyberattack
on an offshore platform as platform operators. If insurance companies do
not have an exclusionary policy that would automatically prevent
companies from recovering in the aftermath of a cyberattack, then the
ambiguity of what constitutes a competent cybersecurity protocol creates
an equally devastating—but potentially unwritten—exclusionary policy
that would prevent companies from recovery.
B. Liability
If companies’ policies are not adequate and protocols to prevent
cyberattack are not in place, companies could be wide open to liability with
no protection against billion-dollar lawsuits. If companies are not going to
take their cyberthreats seriously, they need to take their liability coverage
seriously. Expounding upon what happened to BP:
After the explosion, litigation ensued between the developer,
BP, and the insurers of Transocean. Transocean owned the oil
134. Hannan, supra note 75, at 1023.
135. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/2

2019]

Cybersecurity and Offshore Oil

733

drilling rig. The dispute focused on whether and to what extent
an underlying drilling contract between BP and Transocean
limited the scope of insurance coverage available to BP as an
additional insured under Transocean’s insurance policies. 136
After the disaster, when lawsuits started piling up against BP, including
“numerous personal injury and environmental claims,” 137 BP made a
demand for coverage under the Transocean insurance policy. Following the
demand, “Transocean’s insurers denied the claim, asserting BP’s additional
insured status was limited under the drilling contract solely to liability
assumed by Transocean for above-surface pollution.”138 The case made its
way to the Supreme Court of Texas, which held that, while the insurance
policies expressed no limitation to BP’s coverage, BP did not have
coverage for the lives lost or the environmental destruction that occurred as
a result of the disaster.139 Deepwater Horizon is a cautionary tale of what
can happen to a company that does not understand the implications of their
own insurance policy. Operators of offshore platforms need to clarify what
implications a cyberattack would have on an insurance policy.
Insurance coverage for cyber security on offshore platforms is not
unlimited. In fact, it is extremely limited and comprehensive policies are
rare, resulting in a serious need for increased cybersecurity industry wide
simply to avoid the massive liability companies expose themselves to
otherwise. Companies need to understand that if the government does not
institute cybersecurity regulation at the federal level it is their responsibility
to implement industry standard or their own cybersecurity protocol.
Insurance and liability coverage is not going to cover the monetary damage
that accumulates following a large-scale disaster, no matter how
comprehensive it is. Furthermore, it is not likely that insurers will even
begin to cover companies for cyberattacks until binding federal regulation
is in place across the oil and gas industry.

136. Melissa N. Collar and DeAndre’ Harris, ‘Deepwater Horizon’: A Cautionary
Insurance
Tale,
GRAND RAPIDS BUSINESS JOURNAL
(Dec.
16,
2016),
https://www.grbj.com/articles/86830-deepwater-horizon-a-cautionary-insurance-tale
(internal citations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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VIII. Conclusion
There is not a feasible way to thoroughly and comprehensively protect
offshore oil platforms in United States from cyberattacks. This fact does
not mean that there is not a way to enhance the regulatory protections of
these platforms.
Terrorists recognize inherent weaknesses in the cybersecurity of
offshore platforms as evidenced by attacks over the last 15 years on
industry operations in Turkey, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the African
coast. It is likely that attacks will only continue to increase. Attacks
continue because technology of offshore platforms continues to become
more complex and more interconnected and the vulnerabilities of platforms
continue to increase.
There are international laws that detail how to protect offshore oil
platforms from a physical attack. These laws outline what offshore oil
platforms should do to protect themselves; what they could do to protect
themselves; and what they must do. Government needs to establish
regulation to help platforms protect themselves from cyberattacks in the
same way that current international law helps set guideposts to protect
platforms from physical attacks.
At the time of publication, no current federal laws establish specific,
legally binding regulations for cybersecurity on offshore oil platforms.
Industry standards abound but are not legally binding. The oil and gas
industry has always been slow to respond to movements in industry
standard, that is, until government forces have pushed it into action.
Offshore platforms have better mechanisms for protection if industry
standard is integrated into governmental oversight and regulation.
Ultimately, the ramifications of not having government oversight are that
innocent lives are put in jeopardy and companies are at risk of going
bankrupt if assurances are not in place to make sure companies are meeting
cybersecurity standards.
Ultimately when companies chose cost-saving over safety, those that
survive without incident falsely demonstrate to others that their behavior
involves no risk. Should cost-saving become the industry standard over
cybersecurity (without legally binding federal regulation in place), offshore
rigs would be vulnerable to an onslaught of terrorist activity causing a true
environmental and economic crisis. Federal regulation provides a simple,
effective, and ultimately, budget friendly answer to the threat of
cyberattack. Looking back, years from now, following a deadly attack that
cost billions in clean up and environmental destruction, no individual
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should have the ability to say, “if appropriate regulation existed this attack
would have been preventable.” Implementation of cybersecurity regulation
is necessary to prevent the next big threat from becoming a reality.
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